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6.1 Introduction
Recent contributions show that the Italian corporate governance regime
exhibits low legal protection for investors and poor legal enforcement (La
Porta et al. 1998), underdeveloped equity markets (La Porta et al. 1997),
pyramidal groups, and very high ownership concentration (Barca 1994).
Arguably, due to these institutional characteristics, private beneﬁts of con-
trol are high (Zingales 1994), and minority shareholders are often expro-
priated (Bragantini 1996). How did this corporate governance system
emerge over time?
In this paper we use a unique data set with information on the control of
all companies traded on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE) in the twentieth
century to study the evolution of the stock market, the dynamics of the
ownership structure of traded ﬁrms, the birth of pyramidal groups, and the
growth and decline of ownership by families.
We ﬁnd that all our indicators (stock market development, ownership
concentration, separation of ownership and control, and the power of fam-
ilies) followed a nonmonotonic pattern. The MSE showed more signs of
development at the beginning and at the end of the century than in the
middle of the century. Widely held pyramids were more common in 1947
and in 2000 than in 1987. Pyramidal groups and the separation of owner-
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1940s or in 2000. Family-controlled groups were more powerful in the
middle of the century than at the beginning or at the end of it.
The results of our analysis can be explained as the joint eﬀect of laws and
politics on the Italian ﬁnancial market. During the beginning of the cen-
tury, Italian capitalism was characterized by a limited and indirect inter-
vention of the government in the economy and in the stock market. The
Great Depression forced the government to intervene on a much larger
scale because the crisis led to the collapse of Italy’s three main investment
banks. Since then, the government has maintained a direct role in the econ-
omy by bailing out companies in trouble, as well as by controlling compa-
nies, especially in capital-intensive sectors.
Direct intervention by the state as an entrepreneur partially replaced
and crowded out the role of the private sector in the accumulation of capi-
tal. Since the state took a direct and massive role in allocating capital, Ital-
ian legislators did not consider the improvement of investor protection im-
portant for Italy. This is at odds with the experience of countries such as the
United States, where the government faced similar challenges to those of
Italy but chose to intervene as a regulator of capital markets rather than as
a substitute. In an environment with no regulatory reforms, and frequent
direct intervention by the state, Italian stock market activity declined in the
1950s and 1960s to a level lower than that of the early twentieth century.
With low investor protection and underdeveloped capital markets, new
entrepreneurs found it very expensive to go public. Conversely, incumbent
groups thrived in the market by allying themselves with politicians. During
the fascist regime, autarchy protected them from foreign imports. By the
postwar period, family capitalism ﬁrmly controlled the Italian economy.
Important families enjoyed both economic and political power, which was
transmitted from generation to generation. New publicly traded family
groups seldom emerged. When they did, it was always due to strong polit-
ical connections.
In this environment the majority of Italian ﬁrms stayed away from the
stock market, were closely held by the founders’ families, and operated on
a relatively small scale in niche markets. Family-controlled pyramidal
groups and state-controlled conglomerates dominated the stock market.
Because poor investor protection made Italian stock market unattractive,
investors preferred to invest in government bonds rather than in equities.
To ﬁnance the costs of its active role in the economy, the government
increased taxation and public debt. Eventually, public debt soared out of
control, and in the 1990s the government engaged in a sweeping privatiza-
tion program in an eﬀort to reduce this debt. The government coupled the
sale of assets with substantial improvement of the legal protection for mi-
nority shareholders. These changes made going public more appealing for
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stock market came a greater demand for good corporate governance by in-
vestors, which imposed tighter constraints on family groups.
Currently, Italian capitalism is going through a very diﬃcult transition
period. Family groups, who were initially caught unprepared for the in-
creased demand for good corporate governance, are slowly adapting to the
rules of the international capital markets.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 6.2 brieﬂy describes the
institutional framework of Italian capitalism, focusing speciﬁcally on its
legal and political environment. Section 6.3 focuses on the evolution of the
stock market. Section 6.4 studies the dynamics of the ownership structure
of traded ﬁrms. Family capitalism and the growth and decline of ownership
by families are discussed in section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.1.1 Related Literature
The paradigm in the literature on comparative corporate governance is
the law and ﬁnance view, as developed by La Porta et al. (1998). This ap-
proach emphasizes that the protection of minority investors provided by
the law is the key determinant of the corporate governance regime within a
country. The argument is that investors will not provide equity to ﬁnance a
ﬁrm unless they are conﬁdent of receiving a fair return from their invest-
ment. If shareholder protection is low, minority shareholders require a
high return from their investment to compensate them for the high risk of
expropriation by the management or by the controlling shareholder. Be-
cause external ﬁnance is more costly, ownership will be more concentrated
and fewer companies will go public.
Several cross-country studies show that better legal protection of mi-
nority shareholders is associated with more developed stock markets (La
Porta et al. 1997), higher valuation (La Porta et al. 2002), greater dividend
payouts (La Porta et al. 2000), lower concentration of ownership and con-
trol (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999), lower private beneﬁts
of control (Dyck and Zingales 2004; Nenova 2003), lower earnings man-
agement (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003), lower cash balances (Dittmar,
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes 2003), higher correlation between investment
opportunities and actual investments (Wurgler 2000), and a more active
market for mergers and acquisitions (Rossi and Volpin 2004).
This paper builds on this literature but looks at the time series implica-
tion by focusing on one country (Italy) over one century of history.
6.2 Institutional Framework
Over the century, several important political decisions aﬀected the stock
market and the regulatory environment. In this section, we brieﬂy review
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economic policy and legislation.1
6.2.1 Economic Policy
At the end of the nineteenth century, Italy was still lagging behind in the
industrialization process. The absence of spontaneous industrialization led
to the creation of substitute factors (Gerschenkron 1962) and speciﬁcally
to the development of universal banks. Banca Commerciale Italiana and
Credito Italiano were both established in 1894 with the backing of German
capital and management.
The period from 1896 to 1914 was the ﬁrst phase of intense industrial-
ization in the country. The two banks provided ﬁnancial resources and
managerial skills to the most important entrepreneurial initiatives, includ-
ing Breda (train engines), FIAT (automobiles), and Montecatini (mining),
and facilitated the birth of essential electrical and steel sectors.
However, universal banks were not able to bear the entire weight of the
industrialization process. Already in 1887, government intervention was
needed to rescue a large steel company, Terni, and its lenders from bankruptcy.
In 1911, the government and the largest banks rescued the entire steel sector.
In 1923 the Bank of Italy bailed out the largest company of the time, Ansaldo,
and its two major creditors, Banca Italiana di Sconto and Banco di Roma.
These events indicate that Italian capitalism required the continuous
assistance and involvement of the government from the start. The Great
Depression forced the government to intervene on a much larger scale. The
ﬁnancial crisis led to the collapse of Italy’s three main investment banks:
Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano, and Banco di Roma. As a result, in
1933 the government created a new agency, the Instituto per la Rico-
struzione Industriale (IRI), to manage the large portfolio of companies
previously controlled by the three banks.
Since that time, the Italian state has maintained a direct presence in the
economy as the controlling shareholder of proﬁt-oriented ﬁrms. The role
of the state in the economy grew larger with the advent of the Republic. In-
stead of limiting its interventions to bailing out troubled companies, the
state began acquiring sound companies and directly investing in all sectors
of the economy. Due to its increased involvement in the Italian economy,
the government created a second agency, named the Ente Nazionale Idro-
carburi (ENI), in 1952. The ENI coordinated state-owned companies op-
erating in the chemical, oil, and mining sectors. The government formed
other institutions in 1962 (Eﬁm) and in 1972 (Gepi) to direct state eco-
nomic intervention in Southern Italy. All of these agencies were indepen-
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1. The focus here is on policymaking rather than political regimes, which also changed dra-
matically during the twentieth century. Until 1923, Italy was a constitutional monarchy; from
1923 to 1945, it was a dictatorship. Since the end of the Second World War, Italy has been a
democracy.dent of one another. In principle, they were managed as proﬁt-oriented
corporations, though they could rely on ﬁnancial assistance from the Trea-
sury if they ran into deﬁcits. Their presidents had very strong personalities
and ample opportunities to take advantage of their power.2 Over its life
from 1933 to 2000 (IRI was liquidated in June 2000), IRI acquired forty-
two traded companies, did twenty-six carve-outs of subsidiaries, delisted
forty, and sold twenty-eight companies. ENI acquired eight companies, did
six carve-outs of subsidiaries, delisted ﬁve, and sold six companies.
The government’s decision to nationalize the electrical industry in early
1960s proved to be an important event for the Italian stock market. Politi-
cal goals determined such a decision. The Christian Democrats, in power
since the end of the war, had seen their share of electoral consensus steadily
decrease from 49 percent in 1948 to around 38 percent by 1958. After fail-
ing to co-opt parties that were ideologically closer, to retain power, the
Christian Democrats resorted to attracting the Socialist Party, which con-
trolled about 8 percent of the seats in Parliament. As a condition of their
support, the socialists required the nationalization of the electric industry.3
The fate of the electric sector had been set since the end of the 1950s. The
political debate concerned whether to acquire only the assets from the elec-
tric companies, or to acquire the companies themselves. The decision to
pay companies for their assets was made on June 17, 1962, and became law
on December 12, 1962. The government left other decisions about the fu-
ture of the companies to their shareholders.4
The 1962 nationalization had important implications for the stock mar-
ket and the entire economy. The electrical groups played a crucial role in
the stock market: not only did they represent approximately one-third of
the total market capitalization, but they also functioned as a nucleus of
economic and political power to a large extent free of government control.
The ﬁrst eﬀect of the nationalization was a sequence of mergers inside these
groups, later followed by mergers among these groups. Rather than paying
out the proceeds to shareholders, the groups invested the payments ob-
tained from the nationalization. Incompetent or dishonest managers5
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2. The second president of ENI, Eugenio Ceﬁs, serves as one extreme example. At the be-
ginning of the seventies, he used his power to push ENI through an intense period of acquisi-
tions and suspicious ﬁnancial operations. Some years later he was found guilty of corruption.
For a detailed discussion see Barca and Trento (1997).
3. Like Labour in the United Kingdom and Socialists in France, who implemented similar
projects just after the war, Italian Socialists wanted to reduce the rents enjoyed by the com-
panies operating in that industry.
4. The railways’ nationalization at the beginning of the century served as a model for this
plan. The compensation paid to railway companies on that occasion provided them with the
resources to invest in and give birth to the electric industry.
5. A good example is the merger in 1964 between SADE, a former electric company, and
Montecatini, a chemical company. As reported by Scalfari and Turani (1974), Vittorio Cini,
the CEO of SADE, negotiated a very poor deal for SADE’s shareholders in exchange for a
seat on the board of directors of Montecatini for himself.channeled most of the resources toward the chemical industry, giving birth
to Montedison, which soon also came under government control (ENI).
However, investing in the chemical industry proved unproﬁtable in a coun-
try with limited natural resources. As a result, the ﬁnancial resources pro-
vided by the government as a compensation for the forced nationalization
ended up almost entirely wasted.
State-owned enterprises contributed signiﬁcantly to the growth of the
country in the 1950s and 1960s (Barca and Trento 1997). However, over
time they became a burden for economic growth because of weak man-
agerial incentives, soft-budget constraints, ineﬃcient production tech-
nologies, and misallocation of resources. The government ﬁnanced these
losses mainly with public debt. At the beginning of the 1990s, public debt
soared out of control. Under pressure from the European Union, Italy’s
high level of debt forced the government to engage in a sweeping privatiza-
tion program (see Goldstein 2003).
The extent of product market competition in Italy also changed
throughout the century. The absence of antitrust legislation until 1991 im-
plied that large companies enjoyed unlimited market power until that time.
Most families whose companies traded on the stock market ﬁnanced the
expansion of their empires with the large proﬁts achieved from monopo-
listic rents in their core sector (the cases of Agnellis, Pesentis, and Pirellis
are discussed in section 6.5).
Because of the government’s direct intervention the extent of interna-
tional competition followed a nonmonotonic pattern. The beginning of the
twentieth century saw a trend of increasing market integration across Eu-
ropean economies. By 1930 European economies were eﬀectively truly
interdependent. The trend waned after the Great Depression with the re-
emergence of nationalist isolationism, the introduction of foreign ex-
change controls, and the abolition of external convertibility.
Eﬀectively, Italy remained in an autarkic regime until 1958, when it
joined the European Economic Community (EEC). Since then, product
markets and capital markets have slowly liberalized, allowing foreign com-
petition. The EEC directives ﬁrst imposed a liberalization of product mar-
kets, and later a liberalization of the capital markets as well (see Battilossi
2000). Not until 1990 had all constraints on cross-border transactions
eﬀectively been lifted.
6.2.2 Legal and Regulatory Environment
Over the sample period analyzed in this paper, the legal environment in
Italy and, consequently, the degree of investor protection aﬀorded by the
law has also changed considerably. Table 6.1lists in chronological order the
major regulatory events aﬀecting traded companies and ﬁnancial markets.
All events listed in the table occurred either before the Second World War
or after 1974. This suggests us to divide the century into three subperiods,
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Stock Exchange
Aug. 4, 1913 Regulation of stockbrokers: banks cannot engage in trading on the
stock market.
Apr. 8, 1974 Creation of CONSOB, agency in charge of the supervision over the
stock markets.
Mar. 31, 1975 Deﬁnition of CONSOB’s powers.
May 17, 1991 Insider trading law.
Nov. 14, 1991 Regulation of disclosure requirements by companies oﬀering securities
to the public.
Feb. 12, 1992 Takeover law: mandatory bid rule.
Feb. 24, 1998 Passivity rule: managers cannot ﬁght against a takeover without
shareholder approval (legge Draghi).
Bankruptcy code
Mar. 16, 1942 Bankruptcy Law. The main procedures for non-state-owned ﬁrms are:
liquidation (fallimento) or reorganization (amministrazione controllata
or concordato preventivo). State-owned companies are subject to a third
procedure called liquidazione coatta amministrativa.
Jan. 30, 1979 Special procedure (amministrazione straordinaria) for large ﬁrms (legge
Prodi).
June 5, 1986 Simpliﬁcation of the procedure for state-owned companies.
Banking
Mar. 12, 1936 Delegation to the Bank of Italy of the supervision over the banking
sector. Separation between commercial and investment banks: only the
second group can engage in long-term lending and can own equity
stakes in nonﬁnancial companies.
Sept. 1, 1993 New law on banking and lending. Universal banking is allowed.
Information disclosure by traded companies
Mar. 16, 1942 New commercial code: Shares with multiple votes are prohibited and
cross-shareholdings are limited.
June 7, 1974 New disclosure requirements. New limits to cross-shareholdings. Listed
companies can issue nonvoting shares (“savings shares”).
Mar. 31, 1975 External auditing required for the annual report.
June 4, 1985 Removal of a restriction to the ability to trade shares (clausola di
gradimento).
Apr. 9, 1991 Consolidated balance sheet required for groups.
Feb. 24, 1998 Strengthening of minority shareholders’ rights (legge Draghi).
Institutional investors
Mar. 23, 1983 Open-end mutual funds are allowed to operate and are subject to
CONSOB’s supervision.
Jan. 2, 1991 Regulation of institutional investors.
Jan. 27, 1992 Deﬁnition of disclosure and accounting requirements for mutual funds.
Aug. 14, 1993 Authorization to the creation of close-end funds.
July 23, 1996 Regulation of mutual funds and ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Feb. 24, 1998 New law on ﬁnancial intermediation.
Notes:This table lists the most important regulatory acts aﬀecting investor protection in Italy.
The events are classiﬁed into ﬁve categories depending on whether they are mostly relevant
for the stock exchange, the bankruptcy procedure, the banking sector, information disclosure
by traded companies, or institutional investors. The main feature of each regulatory act is
brieﬂy described.1900–1941, 1942–1973, and 1974–2000, each characterized by an increas-
ing degree of investor protection.
In the ﬁrst subsample, the stock market was virtually self-regulated.
Firms could issue shares with multiple votes and use cross-shareholdings
without limitation. Until the Bank Law of 1936 no limitations existed on
banks’ abilities to own industrial companies, lend money for both short-
and long-term periods, underwrite security issues, and hold deposits.
Eﬀectively, banks served the role of today’s venture capitalists, investment
banks, and commercial banks. There was only one bankruptcy procedure,
which consisted of a straight liquidation. Though legally allowed to incor-
porate as joint-stock companies—società anonime—since 1865, only few
large ﬁrms took advantage of limited liability. The Commercial Code of
1882 required the approval of an annual report by shareholders but not the
extent of information disclosure.
During the entire second period (1942–1973), laws introduced at the be-
ginning of the period under the fascist regime regulated traded companies
and ﬁnancial markets. The laws included the Bank Law (1936), the Civil
and Commercial Code (1942), and the Bankruptcy Law (1942). These laws
improved shareholder protection in limited-liability companies. Compa-
nies were required to provide some minimal amount of information on
their performance in annual reports for shareholders. In an attempt to curb
cross-shareholdings, controlled companies could no longer exercise the
voting rights of shares owned in the holding company. The Bankruptcy
Law allowed creditors to opt for a form of reorganization as an alternative
to straight liquidation. The Bank Law prohibited universal banking and
prevented banks from holding equity stakes in nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Com-
mercial banks could engage mainly in short-term lending.
This set of laws, designed for a small economy in which the capital mar-
kets had a marginal role (as they did in Italy in the 1930s), gradually be-
came obsolete and unable to address the needs of a developed country
competing in international markets. For instance, the company law did not
draw any distinction between traded and nontraded companies, imposing
the same set of rules on both. No speciﬁc rules existed regarding informa-
tion disclosure by a traded company, and no speciﬁc agency was in charge
of stock market supervision. As a result, in the 1960s the balance sheets of
large companies like Edison, Pirelli, and Snia Viscosa did not disclose ba-
sic items such as sales (Amatori and Brioschi 1997). In theory the stock
market was free to set its own rules, but without any enforcement power, it
was eﬀectively unregulated.
In 1974, the legislature ﬁnally broke its thirty-year-long neglect of the
stock market by creating CONSOB, the agency in charge of supervising
the stock market, and by drafting a set of disclosure requirements explic-
itly created for traded companies. The Italian government modeled CON-
SOB on the Securities Exchange Commission in the United States. It took
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CONSOB to become operational. It took much more time for the power
and relevance of CONSOB to become real.
At the same time, the legislators drafted speciﬁc requirements for traded
companies to stimulate investment in the stock market by the general
public. To this end, disclosure requirements were introduced in 1974 and
traded companies were allowed to issue nonvoting shares (“savings
shares”). Although these shares did not provide any voting rights, they en-
titled the owner to a higher dividend than ordinary shares. As suggested by
their name, savings shares were deemed appropriate for unsophisticated
investors. In 1975, the government imposed external auditing of the bal-
ances of traded companies as a requirement and also introduced new ac-
counting rules for statements of ﬁnancial companies, banks, and insurance
companies. Since 1974, the acquisition of more than 2 percent of the vot-
ing rights of a traded company must be reported to CONSOB within forty-
eight hours (since 1992, this information must be disclosed to the public).
The 1990s proved a period of very intense legislation, largely due to the
European Community’s pressure to harmonize stock market regulation
within Europe. In 1991 came the requirement of consolidated balances for
groups; in 1992 came the takeover law. At the same time, regulations by
CONSOB in 1991 and 1992 imposed information disclosure on mutual
funds.6 These requirements increased the transparency of the ownership
structure of traded companies. In 1991, the Italian government enacted its
ﬁrst antitrust law.
Even with these important improvements, in 1994 Italy still ranked
among the lowest of the industrial countries in legal protection for in-
vestors among the industrialized countries (La Porta et al. 1998). Antidi-
rector rights, their index of shareholder protection, equaled one out of six
for Italy.7 Despite all of the protections put into place, the legislation did
not suﬃciently protect small shareholders from expropriation by control-
ling blockholders. In fact, the regulation of groups of companies and the
takeover law both contained loopholes, such as the limited protection
oﬀered to the owners of nonvoting shares. Moreover, minority sharehold-
ers had too little power to protect themselves. For example, 20 percent of
the capital was needed to call a shareholder meeting, a very high threshold
to meet. Shares had to be deposited in a bank in order to be voted, and
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6. Mutual funds were allowed to operate since 1983.
7. The index is formed by adding one when (a) the country allows shareholders to mail their
proxy vote to the ﬁrm, (b) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the
general shareholders’ meeting, (c) cumulative voting or proportional representation of mi-
norities in the board of directors is allowed, (d) an oppressed-minorities mechanism is in
place, (e) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an ex-
traordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or
(f) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. Ac-
cording to La Porta et al. (1998), in 1994 Italian shareholders had only preemptive rights.there was no vote by mail. These and other rules made it costly for small
shareholders to vote.
In 1998, important steps were taken toward better legal protection for
investors with the so-called Legge Draghi (Draghi’s Law), named for its
leading drafter. The law prohibited managerial opposition to takeovers
without shareholder approval. If evaluated in terms of the index of share-
holder protection developed by La Porta et al. (1998), the impact of this
law was an improvement in shareholder protection from one to ﬁve. Specif-
ically, the law reduced the threshold to call a shareholder meeting to 10 per-
cent, it also corrected the loopholes in the takeover law, and it gave minor-
ity shareholders more rights to voice their opinions.8
6.3 The Stock Market
In 1808, the Napoleonic government established the Milan Stock Ex-
change as a market for securities and commodities. As noticed by Baia
Curioni (1995) and De Luca (2002), unlike the markets in London and
Amsterdam, the MSE was not created spontaneously by the ﬁnancial
operators of the time but was created by the government. Possibly for this
reason, the market did not start to serve as the main ﬁnancial center in Mi-
lan until the 1850s. At that time, the only traded securities were govern-
ment bonds. In 1859, the ﬁrst shares (of a railway company, Societa’ delle
Strade Ferrate Lombardo Veneto) were listed. This ﬁrst traded company
was followed by many banks and a few industrial companies. In 1873,
shares of twenty-ﬁve companies were traded on the MSE.
At that time, the MSE was a local exchange. Stock exchanges of similar
sizewereset up in several other Italian cities. In 1873, the MSE ranked sec-
ond for trade volume after Genoa, but before Turin, Florence, Rome, and
Naples.
The absence of regulation oﬀered speculators wide opportunities to
proﬁt and kept uninformed investors (and liquidity) away. The turning
point for the MSE came with the intense industrialization push between
1895 and 1907. In twelve years, the number of traded companies jumped
from 27 to 171. The intense activity of the universal banks, Banca Com-
merciale and Credito Italiano, caused the boom of the stock market. The
two banks helped many entrepreneurs raise capital for their projects by set-
ting up limited-liability companies and selling shares on the stock market.
According to Bonelli (1971), in 1907 72 percent of the equity of all limited-
liability ﬁrms was traded on stock markets.
The stock market boom lasted only for a few years. According to Sicil-
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8. According to Enriques (2003), for the period 1942–93 the correct score on antidirector
rights for Italy is 2 rather than 1 because proportional representation on the board was an op-
tion available to any ﬁrms since 1942.iano (2001), Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano, and the other banks
probably inﬂated stock prices by purchasing shares while borrowing
against their equity stakes in traded ﬁrms. An increase in the short-term in-
terest rates in 1907 increased the banks’ costs of sustaining prices. The re-
sulting liquidity crisis forced the banks ﬁrst to stop buying shares and then
to sell their stakes in the traded ﬁrms. In turn, the sale of their stakes put
downward pressure on prices, thereby exacerbating the crisis. This major
ﬁnancial crisis lasted until 1914.
The crisis of 1907 spurred a regulatory intervention by the govern-
ment. After years of debates, in 1913 a new law prohibited banks from
trading shares of companies listed on the stock exchanges. According to
Baia Curioni (1995), this regulatory intervention proved the major cause
of the underdevelopment of the Italian stock market. Siciliano (2001)
disagrees, however, because France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States introduced similar laws without damaging eﬀects on the
stock market.
With no doubts, the crisis of 1907 profoundly impacted small investors.
A good example is FIAT, the automotive company at the core of the Ag-
nellis’ empire, which was then traded on the Turin stock exchange. The
company operated in a glamorous (for the time) sector, which had tremen-
dous growth opportunities and had generated a lot of excitement in the in-
vesting public. In 1906, FIAT’s stock traded at Lit 2,000 per share (a price-
earnings ratio of twenty-eight). The collapse of the stock market brought
the share price down to Lit 17 in just a few months. The creditors stepped
in to rescue the company from the brink of liquidation. A pool of banks,
led by Banca Commerciale, cancelled existing shares, approved a new
share issue, and gave back the control of the company to Giovanni Agnelli,
the chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) before the crisis.
A thousand small shareholders, who had seen the value of their shares
disappear, sued the managers of FIAT for accounting irregularities and
price manipulation. The trial received signiﬁcant attention because of
Giovanni Agnelli’s close friendship with Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti.
The trial lasted ﬁve years and concluded with the declaration that Agnelli
was not guilty of any wrongdoing.
By 1918, the MSE became Italy’s main stock exchange, although by then
the phase of strong development had ended. Figure 6.1plots the number of
companies traded on the MSE over the twentieth century as a raw number
and as a fraction of the population (in millions). La Porta et al. (1997) sug-
gest that the latter measure is a good indicator of stock market develop-
ment. The ﬁgure shows a highly nonmonotonic pattern of development.
The strong growth of the beginning of the century lasted until 1914, and a
period of limited growth followed until 1930.
Figure 6.1 shows that the Great Depression brought about a drastic re-
duction in the number of traded companies. With the nationalization of the
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ary in the process of allocation of capital toward investment.
One important cause of the end of the period of growth for the stock
market was the lack of protection for minority shareholders. There was a
general market perception that universal banks and managers like Agnelli
used the investment boom early in the century to pump and dump their
shares. Further, the drastic increase of dividend taxation at company and
personal level introduced by the fascist government made investment in
the stock market even less attractive (Aleotti 1990).
The situation improved marginally after the Second World War. In this
period, a total of ten local stock markets existed in Italy. In 1962, the na-
tionalization of the electric industry caused a pronounced reduction in the
total market capitalization as shown in ﬁgure 6.2, which plots the total
market capitalization as a percentage of the gross national products over
time. It is interesting to note that the nationalization itself was not associ-
ated with a decrease in market capitalization. To the contrary, total market
capitalization increased considerably while the politicians debated the new
law. It was the subsequent wasting of resources in negative net present
value (NPV) projects brought the market down.
The slow decline of investment in the stock market continued until the
middle of the seventies, when the government established CONSOB (in
336 Alexander Aganin and Paolo Volpin
Fig. 6.1 Evolution over time of the number of companies traded on the MSE
Notes:The continuous line represents the raw number and is measured against the axis on the
left. The dotted line, whose values are shown on the right axis, represents the number of ﬁrms
divided by the population in millions. The time series of the population is obtained from Rey
(1991) and Datastream.1974). Substantial growth of the stock market began with the introduction
of the mutual funds in 1983. In the three years between 1983 and 1986, mu-
tual funds raised and invested about $6 billion in the stock market (De
Luca 2002). These new available resources induced many companies to go
public. Between 1983 and 1989, the number of companies traded on the
stock market jumped up more than 50 percent. However, most of the new
listings were subsidiaries of traded companies going public to take advan-
tage of the stock market boom (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998).
The real push in stock market development came after the start of the re-
cent privatization program. In 1995 the stock market capitalization was
only 20 percent of the gross national product (GNP). In 2000 it had grown
to 70 percent. The increase in market capitalization was due to the listing
of huge government-controlled companies, such as ENI (chemicals), INA
(insurance), IMI (banking), and ENEL (energy), and the sale of the gov-
ernment-owned control stakes in already-listed banks, such as Comit,
Credit, and BNL. These privatizations went hand in hand with regulatory
reforms, such as the law on insider trading in 1991, the takeover law in
1992, and Draghi’s Law in 1998.
With a total market capitalization in 2000 of 70 percent of GNP, the
MSE is comparable to stock markets in other developed countries. How-
ever, the Italian stock market does not mirror the Italian economy. Large
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Fig. 6.2 Evolution over time of the market capitalization of the MSE
Notes: The continuous line is the total market capitalization as a percentage of the gross na-
tional product (GNP) and is measured against the axis on the left. The time series of the GNP
is obtained from Rey (1991) and Datastream. The dotted line, whose values are shown on the
right axis, is the index of stock prices on the MSE. The index is from Dimson, Marsh, and
Staunton (2001); it measures the evolution of stock prices in real terms and is normalized so
that it takes the value 1 in 1900.corporations and ﬁnancial institutions dominate the stock market, while
the greatest majority of ﬁrms shy away from the stock market.
6.3.1 Investor Protection and Stock Market Development
According to La Porta et al. (1998), stock market development should
be positively correlated with shareholder protection. The intuition is that
investors will not provide equity to ﬁnance a ﬁrm unless they are conﬁdent
of receiving a fair return from their investment. If shareholder protection
is low, minority shareholders require a high return from their investment to
compensate them for the high risk of expropriation by the management or
controlling shareholder. The high required rate of return makes external ﬁ-
nance costly and leads fewer companies to go public. Consistent with this
prediction, La Porta et al. (1997) ﬁnd that in the 1990s countries with
stronger shareholder protection were characterized by larger stock mar-
kets.9 This ﬁnding results from a cross section of countries, but it should
also hold with time series data for a single country.
Totest this prediction we compare the stock market development across
the three subsamples identiﬁed in section 6.2.2, which display signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in investor protection. As discussed before, the period 1900–41
had the lowest level of investor protection; 1974–2000 exhibited the high-
est investor protection of the periods; an intermediate level of investor
protection characterized the years between 1942 and 1973. As alternative
measures of stock market development, we use the ratio of the number of
traded companies to population (in millions) and market capitalization as
a percentage of GNP.
As shown in column (1) of table 6.2, the indicators for the periods with
the lowest and the highest investor protection are both positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant in the regression explaining the variation of the number
of traded companies scaled by population during the century. This implies
that the subsample 1942–73 is characterized by higher investor protection
but lower stock market development than the subsample 1900–41. The
comparison between the second (1942–73) and third (1974–2000) sub-
samples is instead fully consistent with the theory: higher investor protec-
tion accompanies more ﬁnancial development. The results do not change
in column (2), where we add the stock market index to control for ﬁrms’
opportunism in their decision to go public.10
In column (3), we use the index of antidirector rights proposed by La
Porta et al. (1998). We follow Enriques (2003) and compute the evolution
of this index from 1900 to 2000. As discussed in footnote 8, the index takes
a value of 1 before 1942, equals 2 for the 1942–93 period, increases to 3 in
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9. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) formally model this theory.
10. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) ﬁnd that market timing is an important determi-
nant of the going-public decision by Italian companies.1994, and jumps to 5 from 1998. The results in column (3) conﬁrm a strong
nonlinear relation between stock market development and investor pro-
tection. Starting from a low level of investor protection (below 2), an in-
crease in investor protection reduces stock market development. The op-
posite happens if we start from a high level of investor protection (above 3).
In columns (4) to (6), we use the market capitalization as a percentage of
GNP as an alternative measure of stock market development. The results
in column (4) indicate that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in stock mar-
ket development across the three subsamples. When we add the stock mar-
ket index, in column (5), we ﬁnd that the period 1900–41 (the period with
the lowest investor protection) is characterized by higher stock market de-
velopment than the later periods. The results in column (6) conﬁrm the U-
shaped relation between stock market development and investor protec-
tion. Overall, the ﬁndings in table 6.2 suggest that there is no monotonic
relationship between investor protection and stock market development,
which is diﬃcult to reconcile with the law and ﬁnance view.
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Table 6.2 Investor protection and stock market development
No. of traded companies  Market capitalization 
scaled by population divided by GNP
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 2.68∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 4.80∗∗∗ 17.15∗∗∗ –0.47 26.06∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.17) (0.34) (1.67) (3.42) (3.20)
Dummy 1900–1941  lower 0.98∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ –0.49 7.83∗∗∗
investor protection (0.15) (0.17) (1.99) (2.19)
Dummy 1974–2000  higher 0.75∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.96 –2.57
investor protection (0.17) (0.16) (4.12) (2.31)
Stock market index 0.08∗∗∗ 0.03 4.44∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.80) (0.49)
Antidirector rights –1.50∗∗∗ –19.61∗∗∗
(0.26) (3.20)
(Antidirector rights)2 0.27∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.83)
R2 0.31 0.36 0.23 0.01 0.61 0.76
No. of observations 101 101 101 69 69 69
Notes: Stock market development (the dependent variable) is measured alternatively as the number of
traded companies divided by population in millions (in columns [1] and [2]) or market capitalization as
a percentage of GNP (in columns [3] and [4]). Independent variables are: a dummy variable that takes
value 1 in the years from 1900 to 1941 and 0 otherwise to represent the period with relatively lower in-
vestor protection; a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the years from 1974 to 2000 and 0 otherwise to
represent the period with relatively higher investor protection; and the stock market index. The latter is
obtained from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2001), is measured in real terms, and is normalized so
that it takes value 1 in 1900. Antidirector rights measure the degree of shareholder protection. It is pro-
duced by La Porta et al. (1998) and extended over time for Italy by Enriques (2003). OLS regressions:
robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.6.3.2 Discussion
An important missing variable in the regressions reported in table 6.2 is
enforcement. La Porta et al. (1998) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)
show that enforcement is a crucial explanatory variable in a cross-country
setting. To evaluate the eﬀect of enforcement, Enriques (2003) analyzes the
quality of Italian corporate judges’ decisions in 123 cases between 1986
and 2000. He ﬁnds that judges tend to be biased in favor of corporate in-
siders and very formalistic in their arguments. Moreover, he ﬁnds no evi-
dence that judges take into account the impact of their decisions on the in-
centives and the behavior of corporations and managers. These ﬁndings
conﬁrm the evidence in La Porta et al. that the quality of legal enforcement
in Italy is very low, as measured by rule of law and judicial eﬃciency. Un-
fortunately, we do not have a time series measure of enforcement that we
can use in our study.
A second variable missing from the regressions in table 6.2 is politics. A
growing academic literature argues that a country’s ﬁnancial development
is the outcome of ideology and the economic interests of voters and pres-
sure groups. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the stock market can be
either fostered or hampered by government action, depending on the bal-
ance of powers between pressure groups. Pagano and Volpin (2001) and Bi-
ais and Perotti (2002) argue that state intervention in the economy should
be negatively correlated with ﬁnancial development, because the state acts
as a substitute for ﬁnancial markets. One proxy for the government’s inter-
vention in the economy is the number of government-controlled compa-
nies on the stock market as a percentage of the total number of traded com-
panies.
Figure 6.3 plots the evolution of stock market development and public
ownership of traded companies over time. The initial period of growth
ended with the Great Depression and was followed by a long period of
stagnation, which lasted until the 1980s. Only in 1985 did the number of
companies on the stock market exceed the level it had reached in 1930.
When combined with the observation that gross domestic product in-
creased by 200 percent in real terms between 1950 and 1980, these data em-
phasize what little relevance to the Italian economy the stock market has
had since the Great Depression. While the stock market stagnated, the role
of the government increased. From 1950 to 1980, between 15 and 20 per-
cent of traded companies in Italy were controlled by the government. The
correlation between the two series is –70 percent.
According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), another important variable to
explain stock market development is openness, deﬁned as the ratio of the
sum of imports and exports to GNP. Their argument is that a country
opens to trade to take advantage of growth opportunities. To ﬁnance these
investment opportunities, incumbents needs to raise capital and therefore
340 Alexander Aganin and Paolo Volpindemand more ﬁnancial development. As discussed in section 6.2.2, Italy
was relatively open to trade at the beginning of the century, became an
autarchy in the 1930s, and opened up to trade again in the late 1950s.
In table 6.3, we add the measures of government intervention and open-
ness to the legal variables. In column (1), we use the number of traded com-
panies as a fraction of population as the dependent variable. We ﬁnd that
only the political variable is signiﬁcant and has the predicted negative sign.
This result is also robust across speciﬁcations. We obtain the same result in
column (2), where ﬁnancial development is measured as market capital-
ization over GNP. In this speciﬁcation, the index of antidirector rights is
also statistically signiﬁcant and positive. This result suggests that once we
control for government intervention investor protection has the predicted
positive impact on stock market development.11 Contrary to Rajan and
Zingales (2003), openness is negatively correlated with ﬁnancial develop-
ment. A possible reason is that openness is positively correlated with GNP,
which is at the denominator in this measure of ﬁnancial development.
In column (3), we look at the number of independent public oﬀerings
(IPOs) as an alternative measure of ﬁnancial development. The fraction of
government-controlled traded ﬁrms is negatively correlated with the num-
ber of IPOs. Also, as in column (2), an increase in investor protection is as-
sociated with an increase in the number of IPOs. Consistent with Rajan
and Zingales (2003), openness is positively correlated with the number of
IPOs. The evidence in column (3) is consistent with all three channels dis-
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Fig. 6.3 Evolution of the presence of the government on the stock market
Notes: The variable called government-controlled traded ﬁrms is the percentage of traded
companies under government control. It is plotted as a continuous line, and its value is shown
on the right axis. The dotted line (measured against the left axis) is the number of companies
traded on the MSE.
11. When we estimate the speciﬁcation in column (1) on the smaller sample of sixty-nine
observations used in column (2), not reported, we obtain the same results as in column (1).cussed above. Once we control for the other channels, stock market devel-
opment increases with investor protection and openness and decreases
with government intervention.
One concern with the results on the political variable is about its inter-
pretation. We argue that state intervention in the economy should be neg-
atively correlated with ﬁnancial development because the state acts as a
substitute for ﬁnancial markets. However, the negative impact of govern-
ment intervention on the number of traded companies could be more di-
rect and less interesting. If the government fully nationalizes one traded
company, the number of traded companies mechanically decreases by one
unit. If this is the case, we expect to see delisting following an increase in
the fraction of government-owned companies. We did not ﬁnd such a rela-
tionship in the data (not reported).
The results in this section leave a key question unanswered: How did Ital-
ian companies ﬁnance the extraordinary economic growth of 1950s and
1960s if the stock market was stagnant? Figure 6.4 suggests that the growth
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Table 6.3 Investor protection, openness and politics
No. of traded  Market 
companies scaled  capitalization  No. of 
by population divided by GNP IPOs
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 3.78∗∗∗ 17.41∗∗∗ 2.62
(0.17) (2.65) (2.19)
Antidirector rights –0.04 8.50∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗
(0.07) (2.07) (1.10)
Government-controlled –0.08∗∗∗ –0.70∗∗∗ –0.46∗∗∗
traded ﬁrms (%) (0.01) (0.17) (0.12)
Openness 0.54 –60.23∗∗∗ 11.87∗
(0.35) (8.71) (6.21)
Stock market index 0.09∗∗∗ 3.41∗∗∗ 0.49
(0.02) (0.42) (0.36)
R2 0.49 0.78 0.24
No. of observations 97 69 97
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of traded companies divided by population in
millions (in column 1), the stock market capitalization as a percentage of GNP (in column 2),
and the number of IPOs (in column 3). Independent variables include the index of antidirec-
tor rights, as produced by LLSV (1998) and extended over time for Italy by Enriques (2003);
the number of government-controlled companies as a percentage of all traded companies;
openness, which is the sum of exports and imports of goods divided by GNP; and the stock
market index. The latter is obtained from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2001), is measured
in real term, and is normalized so that it takes value 1 in 1900. OLS regressions: robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.of the banking sector may be the answer. The growth in per capita GNP oc-
curred at the same time as a similar expansion of the banking sector. The
correlation of 91 percent exists between the ratio of deposit banks’ assets to
GNP and per capita GNP. The correlation of the growth in per capita GNP
with stock market development is much lower: 3 percent if stock market de-
velopment is measured as the number of traded companies to population
and 22 percent if measured as the stock market capitalization to GNP.
6.4 The Ownership Structure of Firms
As shown by Barca (1994) and La Porta et al. (2000), high ownership
concentration and pyramids characterize Italian corporate governance.
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that high ownership concentration
should be more common in countries with lower shareholder protection
because of the inability of companies to sell equity to small shareholders
when investors are not suﬃciently protected by the law. Bebchuk (1999)
points to the fact that control proves valuable in countries with low in-
vestor protection and therefore companies are closely held to ensure that
control is not contestable.12 Wolfenzon (1998) argues that pyramidal
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Fig. 6.4 Evolution of the ratio of deposit banks’ assets to GNP and evolution of
per capita GNP
Sources: Ciocca and Biscaini Cotula (1982), Rey (1991), and International Financial Statis-
tics.
12. Within this second interpretation, countries with low shareholder protection should ex-
hibit controlling shareholders. This, however, does not necessarily imply that there will be
concentrated ownership. Indeed, there can be a lock on control even without a large owner.
This can happen through cross-participation, shareholders’ agreements, and powerful polit-
ical connections.groups are created in order to expropriate shareholders, and this should
occur more often in countries with lower investor protection. Bebchuk,
Kraakman, and Triantis (1999) suggest the same empirical prediction by
highlighting that pyramidal groups allow the separation between owner-
ship and control without giving up control, which is a very important fea-
ture in a country in which control is very valuable.
6.4.1 Investor Protection and Ownership Concentration
Detailed data on ownership structure is available only from 1987 on-
ward. Before 1987, only information on control can be found.13 The only
exception is a booklet produced in 1948 by the trade union of the Commu-
nist Party, the CGIL, which documents the ownership structure of all Ital-
ian ﬁrms at the end of the Second World War.
Because of this data limitation, in this section, we compare the owner-
ship structure of all companies traded on the MSE in three years: 1947,
1987, and 2000. These years can be sorted by investor protection. Accord-
ing to our classiﬁcation in three subperiods, investor protection was lowest
in 1947, intermediate in 1987, and highest in 2000. Using the index of
antidirector rights instead, antidirector rights equaled 2 in 1947 and 1987,
and 5 in 2000. Table 6.4compares six diﬀerent measures of ownership con-
centration across these three samples.
The ﬁrst measure is the fraction of voting rights owned by the largest
shareholder. On average, the largest shareholder directly controlled about
45 percent of the votes in 1947, 55 percent in 1987, and 48 percent in 2000.
According to this measure ownership concentration was higher in 1987
than in 1947 and 2000, while there was no diﬀerence between 1947 and
2000. This result suggests that ownership concentration has changed in a
nonmonotonic fashion, ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing.
The second measure is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the
company did not have a controlling shareholder (that is, if there was no
shareholder with more than 20 percent of voting rights) and 0 otherwise.
Excluding banks and insurance companies, no diﬀerence in this measure
of ownership concentration existed over time. Only between 3.5 and 7.8
percent of the companies had no controlling shareholder. This result sug-
gests that control was very valuable in all three years.
In companies with a controlling shareholder, one can reconstruct the
chain of control and ﬁnd the identity of the ultimate owner. The remaining
four other indicators in table 6.4 characterize ownership concentration in
companies with a controlling shareholder, that is, with a shareholder con-
trolling at least 20 percent of the voting rights.
The number of voting rights controlled by the ultimate owner is the sum
of all votes controlled both directly and indirectly by the ultimate owner in
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13. See the appendix for a detailed description of this issue.a given company. This measure is signiﬁcantly higher in 1987 and 2000
than in 1947. On average, the ultimate owner owned approximately 60 per-
cent of the voting rights in 1987 and 2000 compared to approximately 50
percent in 1947.
The total sum of cash-ﬂow rights owned by the ultimate owner is the
product of the fractions of cash-ﬂow rights along the control chain: it rep-
resents the exposure of the ultimate owner to the cash ﬂows produced by
the company. On average, cash-ﬂow exposure increased over time: the ulti-
mate owner owned about 40 percent of the cash ﬂow rights in 1947, 42 in
1987, and 51 percent in 2000.
Separation between ownership and control is the ratio of voting rights
controlled by the ultimate owner to his cash-ﬂow rights. This variable also
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Table 6.4 Evolution of the ownership structure: Summary statistics
Tests (signiﬁcant percentage level)
1947 1987 2000 1947 vs. 1987 1947 vs. 2000 1987 vs. 2000
No. of observations 120 207 231
Voting rights owned by largest shareholder (%) [538 observations]
Mean 44.58 55.46 48.00 1 0 1
Median 48.65 54.14 52.11 1 5 1
Fraction of ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder (%) [558 observations]
All companies 10.00 4.35 12.99 5 0 1
Excluding banks and 
insurance companies 7.76 3.53 5.62 0 0 0
Voting rights controlled by ultimate owner (%) [494 observations]
Mean 48.98 59.87 57.73 1 1 0
Median 50.10 58.69 55.23 1 1 0
Cash-ﬂow rights owned by ultimate owner (%) [494 observations]
Mean 40.38 42.11 51.31 0 1 1
Median 44.10 47.00 52.92 0 1 1
Separation between ownership and control (voting rights/cash-ﬂow rights) [494 observations]
Mean 1.90 3.16 1.41 5 5 1
Pyramidal level [494 observations]
Mean 1.43 1.86 1.31 1 0 1
Notes: This table compares the mean and median ownership structure in traded companies across the
three subsamples: 1947, 1987, and 2000. Six measures are used to characterize the ownership structure
of a ﬁrm: the percentage of voting rights owned by the largest shareholders, the percentage of ﬁrms with
no controlling shareholder (no shareholder controlling more than 20 percent of the votes), the percent-
age of voting rights controlled (directly or indirectly) by the ultimate owner, the percentage of cash-ﬂow
rights owned by the ultimate owner, the ratio of voting rights and cash-ﬂow rights controlled by the ul-
timate owner, and the pyramidal level, that is, the number of traded companies along the chain of con-
trol, including the company itself. The last four variables are computed only for ﬁrms with a controlling
shareholder. For each of these measures, the sub-sample means (medians) are compared across years us-
ing pair-wise tests of equality of means (medians). 0 denotes no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. 1 denotes signiﬁ-
cance at the 1 percent level. 5 denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.followed a nonmonotonic pattern. First it increased from 1947 to 1987,
and then it decreased from 1987 to 2000.
Pyramidal level is the number of traded companies along the chain of
control, including the company itself. This variable followed a nonmono-
tonic pattern as well. The degree of pyramiding was signiﬁcantly higher in
1987 than in 1947, as many subsidiaries of traded companies went public
during the stock market boom. The degree of pyramiding decreases in
2000 as many subsidiaries were taken private.
6.4.2 Discussion
Overall, there are three main conclusions from table (4): (a) between
1947 and 1987, ownership became more concentrated and there was an in-
crease in pyramiding; (b) between 1987 and 2000, there was a reduction in
ownership concentration and in pyramiding; and (c) across all samples
there was no signiﬁcant change in the fraction of widely held companies,
which remained very rare.
Result (a) seems in contrast with the law and ﬁnance view. Indeed, an
improvement in shareholder protection should decrease ownership con-
centration (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002) and pyramiding (Wolfenzon
1998). One obvious objection is that possibly there was no real change in
investor protection between 1947 and 1987. Although several reforms were
introduced in the 1970s, the index of antidirector rights did not change and
so, probably, did enforcement. This argument does not explain why there
was no pyramiding in 1947.
Result (b) is in favor of the law and ﬁnance view. Between 1987 and 2000,
investor protection certainly improved. The 1990s were characterized by
intensive regulation of traded companies and the stock market. The index
of antidirector rights increased from 2 to 5. Consistent with Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002) and Wolfenzon (1998), between 1987 and 2000 there was
a signiﬁcant decrease in ownership concentration and less pyramiding.
Result (c) is diﬃcult to reconcile with law and ﬁnance. Indeed, the im-
provement in investor protection was not associated with any change in the
fraction of MSE companies that are widely held. One obvious explanation
is that enforcement has always been very poor and has not changed over
time. If so, control remained equally valuable across time because the im-
provement of investor protection did not aﬀect the value of control. But if
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in eﬀective investor protection across the
three years, then how do we explain result (b)?
A possible concern with the methodology used in table 6.4 is that the re-
sults may be due to a composition eﬀect. For instance, since the optimal
ownership concentration may vary across industries, the variation ob-
served in the data may be simply due to changing industry composition
over time. In table 6.5 we evaluate the impact of the legal indicators after
controlling for industry eﬀects. The three main ﬁndings are substantially
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Table 6.5 Evolution of ownership structure: Regressions
Dummy Dummy  Fixed  Adjusted  No.  of 
Constant for 1947 for 1987 eﬀect R2 observations
Dependent variable: Voting rights owned by largest shareholder (%)
(1) 48.25∗∗∗ –5.74∗∗ 8.00∗∗∗ Industry 0.06 538
(1.37) (2.63) (2.00)
(2) 48.50∗∗∗ –2.84 5.82∗ Group 0.12 538
(2.06) (5.03) (3.10)
Dependent variable: Fraction of ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder (%)
(3) 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05 –0.08∗∗∗ Industry 0.12 558
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
(4) 0.09∗∗∗ –0.00 0.01 Group 0.29 558
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Dependent variable: Voting rights controlled by ultimate owner (%)
(5) 57.74∗∗∗ –9.25∗∗∗ 2.33 Industry 0.08 494
(1.12) (2.16) (1.59)
(6) 56.53∗∗∗ –6.12∗∗∗ 3.85 Group 0.06 494
(1.80) (4.36) (2.62)
Dependent variable: Cash-ﬂow rights owned by ultimate owner (%)
(7) 51.26∗∗∗ –11.40∗∗∗ –8.68∗∗∗ Industry 0.07 494
(1.51) (2.91) (2.15)
(8) 43.49∗∗∗ –0.83 5.45∗ Group 0.36 494
(2.00) (4.90) (2.89)
Dependent variable: Separation between ownership and control (voting/cash-ﬂow rights)
(9) 1.41∗∗∗ 0.55 1.67∗∗∗ Industry 0.09 494
(0.23) (0.44) (0.32)
(10) 2.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.37 Group –0.05 494
(0.39) (0.96) (0.56)
Dependent variable: Pyramidal level
(11) 1.29∗∗∗ 0.02 0.55∗∗∗ Industry 0.12 558
(0.06) (0.11) (0.08)
(12) 1.53∗∗∗ –0.22 0.04 Group 0.26 558
(0.08) (0.20) (0.12)
Notes: This table compares the ownership structure in traded companies across the three sub-samples
(1947, 1987 and 2000) while controlling for industry and groups ﬁxed eﬀects. Ownership structure is
characterized by the six measures described in table 6.4. Regressions with ﬁxed eﬀects: robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
conﬁrmed. We also control for ﬁxed eﬀects at the group level, because
diﬀerent groups may have idiosyncratic reasons for choosing a speciﬁc
ownership structure. For instance, pyramiding is likely to be more com-
mon in larger groups. In table 6.5, we ﬁnd that the group ﬁxed eﬀects elim-
inate the diﬀerences in pyramiding.
Figure 6.5 describes the evolution of the control of traded companiesover time. Firms are classiﬁed into six classes of control: ﬁrst, we distin-
guish whether the ﬁrm is a stand-alone or belongs to a pyramidal group.
Second, we diﬀerentiate between family, widely held, and state-controlled
ﬁrms. The ﬁgure shows that stand-alone companies rarely counted for
more than 30 percent of the market value of all traded companies. It is in-
teresting to observe that from the Great Depression on, the importance of
widely held pyramids steadily declined. This trend has been reversed only
recently with the government’s program of privatization. State- and fam-
ily-controlled pyramids were the groups whose shares increased the most.
Family-controlled pyramids represented 30 percent of market capitaliza-
tion of MSE in 1950 and increased steadily to 40 percent in the middle
1980s. More recently, they declined to about 20 percent at the end of the
1990s. Government-controlled pyramids went from 0 to 20 percent of mar-
ket capitalization of MSE during the 1930s and increased steadily to 40
percent by the end of the 1970s. By 2000, after the recent sweeping program
of privatizations, they had almost disappeared.
The extent of pyramiding may be aﬀected by the tax treatment of inter-
company dividends (Morck 2003). The data on Italy do not support this
explanation. Before 1955, dividend income was not taxable in Italy (with
the exception of a few years during the fascist regime when dividend in-
come was subject to taxes). Hence, no double taxation of intercompany
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Fig. 6.5 Distribution of diﬀerent types of control over time
Notes:The size of each class is based on its relative market value. First, we distinguish between
stand-alone companies and members of pyramidal groups. Then, within each category, we
separate state-controlled, family-controlled, and widely held companies depending on whether
the ultimate owner is the government, a family, or dispersed shareholders, respectively.dividends existed. In 1955, Italy introduced a new tax on corporate income
at an average rate of 18 percent, including surcharges. This additional tax
was not deductible in the hands of recipient corporations and therefore dis-
criminated against vertical groups.14 Under the general income tax reform
of 1974, the additional tax burden on vertical groups further increased as
intercompany dividend income became taxable at a 25 percent rate in the
hands of a recipient company. However, pure holding companies became
eligible for taxation of dividend income at a 7.5 percent rate.15 This tax
regime changed in 1977, when the law introduced a tax credit for dividends
that removed double taxation.
Since the treatment of intercompany dividends is the same in the three
years (1947, 1987, and 2000), taxes cannot explain the diﬀerence of pyra-
miding shown in table 6.4. More generally, the evidence is weak. Figure 6.6
shows that the introduction of double taxation in 1955 was not followed by
any signiﬁcant changes in pyramiding.16 Because there was no concurrent
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14. Dividends were taxed both as corporate income of subsidiary and as dividend income
of its parent.
15. Such favorable taxation of pure holding companies may explain why many Italian
traded companies chose to present themselves as pure holdings on the stock market.
16. The steep drop in the average pyramidal level after 1962 was the result of rapid consol-
idation of former electrical companies after nationalization of electrical assets.
Fig. 6.6 Evolution over time of the average pyramidal level
Notes: All government-controlled ﬁrms are excluded. Pyramidal level is deﬁned as the num-
ber of traded companies along the chain of control, including the company itself.change in shareholder protection or other aspects of the institutional envi-
ronment, any changes in the degree of pyramiding can be largely attributed
to the tax eﬀect, which turns out to be very small. At the same time, the
elimination of double taxation in 1977 was not followed by any signiﬁcant
increase in the number of subsidiaries traded on the Italian stock market.
The steep increase in pyramids came only ten years later and can hardly (if
at all) be attributed to the change in the tax regime.
So what caused the increase in pyramids in the 1980s? A tentative expla-
nation to be addressed more carefully in future research is that the ﬁnan-
cial reforms of the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s
channeled new liquidity to the stock market. Because of the reforms, in-
vestors had found new faith in equity investment (for instance, via the
newly established mutual funds). Companies took advantage of this liq-
uidity to raise money via IPOs and carve-outs and grow. Very soon, this
stock market boom came to a stop, and what was left was several pyrami-
dal groups.
6.5 Family Capitalism
The three major family-owned companies in 1928 were Italcementi, a
producer of cement owned by the Pesentis; Pirelli, a producer of rubber ca-
blesand tires owned by the Pirelli family; and FIAT, a car company owned
by the Agnelli family. Their growth largely beneﬁted from the market
power enjoyed in their industries and protection from foreign competition.
The insulation from foreign competition in their core sector partly contin-
ued after the war. Hence, these three major families diverted some re-
sources to invest outside their core sectors, acquiring electric companies,
real estate ﬁrms, banks, and insurance companies.
The history of these three family groups is remarkably similar. Ital-
cementi was set up in 1865 by Carlo Pesenti I, Pirelli was founded in 1872
by Giambattista Pirelli, and FIAT was founded in 1899 by Giovanni Ag-
nelli I. The ﬁrst went public on the MSE in 1874, the second in 1922, and
the third in 1924. Each of them soon acquired control of their product mar-
ket with between 60 and 80 percent market share of the domestic market
and then expanded outside their industry. The Pesentis invested in banks
and insurance companies; the Pirellis expanded in the electric sector and
abroad; the Agnellis mostly invested in the mechanical and electrical com-
ponents sectors and in real estate.
In what follows we present in detail the evolution of the Pesenti group
and discuss more generally the fortunes of the other families.
6.5.1 Evolution of the Pesenti Group
In 1865 Carlo Pesenti I established the ﬁrst company of the Pesenti
group, Italcementi, which went public on the MSE in 1874. The group be-
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son of the founder, took over what had become a very proﬁtable and pow-
erful cement group. According to Confederazione Italiana del Lavoro
(CGIL; 1948), at the time Italcementi produced 60 percent of the cement
in Italy. In the following decade, Italcementi made several diversifying ac-
quisitions through a nontraded subsidiary, Italmobiliare. Turani (1980)
and Galli (1984) argue that monopolistic proﬁts enjoyed by the group in
the cement industry partially ﬁnanced the acquisitions, as well as the un-
limited credit obtained through strong political connections with the rul-
ing Christian Democratic party and the Vatican. By 1953, Italmobiliare
had gained control of an important stake in a traded company producing
machinery, Franco Tosi; after subscribing to its major capital increase, it
had acquired a 38 percent controlling stake in a traded insurance company,
RAS; and it had obtained indirect control of its traded subsidiary, l’Assi-
curatrice Italiana. In this early period, the group also owned several non-
traded banks, including Banca Provinciale Lombarda and Credito Com-
merciale (a third bank, Ibi, was acquired in 1967).
In 1967, at the apex of its expansion, the Pesenti group’s involvement
spanned the cement industry, construction and real estate, the mechanical
and automotive sector, banking, and insurance. At that time the Pesenti
group was second in wealth only to the owners of FIAT group, the Agnel-
lis. The expansion into such diverse industries, ﬁnanced with high leverage,
proved a very risky strategy. The ﬁrst diﬃculty came in 1968, when Carlo
II had to sell the control of a troubled car company, Lancia, acquired in
1960, to the Agnellis, at a considerable loss. A second problem arose in
1972 when Michele Sindona, a Sicilian banker, acquired control of 36.5
percent of Italcementi. This acquisition threatened the Pesentis’ control of
their empire and forced Carlo II to buy out Sindona. The leverage of the
group further increased as a result of ﬁnancing the buyout with loans from
Banca Provinciale Lombarda, which was still controlled by Italcementi
through the nontraded subsidiary Italmobiliare. In 1979, Carlo II had to
fend oﬀanother takeover attempt, this time by the Agnelli group, which ac-
quired control of 10 percent of Italcementi and also threatened the Pesen-
tis’ market power in the cement industry through the expansion of Ag-
nelli’s cement company Unicem. In order to strengthen control over the
group, the Pesenti group decided to change its organizational structure. In
1979 Italcementi distributed its stake in Italmobiliare to its shareholders
on the basis of one Italmobiliare share for every two Italcementi shares
held. The operation led to a listing of Italmobiliare on the MSE in 1980. In
the same year Italmobiliare acquired 50.22 percent of Italcementi’s capital
from the Pesentis and became the holding company for the newly formed
group.
The huge amount of debt incurred during the previous three decades of
expansion led to the group’s implosion in the early eighties. In 1981 l’Assi-
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RAS in 1980; in 1984 the German group Allianz purchased a controlling
stake in RAS. Credito Commerciale was sold to Monte dei Paschi di Siena
in 1982, Ibi was sold to CARIPLO in 1983, and the group’s last bank,
Banca Provinciale Lombarda, was sold to San Paolo Group in 1984. Add-
ing to its ﬁnancial problems, Italmobiliare was also heavily involved in the
notorious bankruptcy of Banco Ambrosiano, being its largest minority
shareholder at the time of its collapse in 1982. Carlo Pesenti II died in 1984
during court proceedings against him and other executives of Italmobiliare
for alleged fraud related to Banco Ambrosiano.
Carlo’s son, Giampiero, who took control of the family business after
Carlo’s death, shaped the present of the Pesenti group. Under Giampiero,
the group returned to its roots by refocusing on the cement industry. In
1987 Italcementi began trading publicly with two subsidiaries, Cementerie
Siciliane and Cementerie di Sardegna, on a wave of investor optimism. By
1995, a year of investor pessimism, both cementeries and the manufactur-
ing company Franco Tosi were losing money. They were delisted from the
MSE after merging with their respective holding companies in 1996 and
1997. Capital increases as well as a subsequent swap of shares of holding
companies and subsidiaries ﬁnanced their three buybacks. In 1997 Ital-
cementi increased its presence in the cement industry by purchasing a con-
trolling stake in cement company Calcemento, a former member of the
bankrupt Ferruzzi group. This subsidiary merged with Italcementi two
years later. Franco Tosi was taken private through a share exchange with
its parent Italmobiliare the same year. The evolution of the group is sum-
marized in table 6.6 and ﬁgure 6.7.
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Going private (delisting) L’Assicuratrice Italiana 1980
Cementerie Siciliane 1996
Cementerie di Sardegna 1996
Franco Tosi 1997
Calcecemento 1999
Note: This table summarizes the corporate events aﬀecting the structure of the group, distin-
guishing among IPOs, acquisitions, sales, and delistings.Fig. 6.7 Evolution of the Pesenti group
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the traded members of the Pesenti group and the structure of the
group at ten-year intervals. Each box represents a traded company. An arrow denotes the
chain of control. The number in the box denotes the pyramidal level.
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3. Cementerie di Sardegna 3. Cementerie Siciliane6.5.2 General Findings
In table 6.7, we show the ten largest groups as measured by market cap-
italization at the end of 1930 and at ten-year intervals until 2000. The
names of groups controlled by families are designated with a superscript b.
The names of government-controlled groups are designated with a super-
script a. As one can immediately see, in 1930, only one family-controlled
group appeared in the top ten: the Agnelli group. A large widely held in-
vestment bank, Banca Commerciale, headed up the largest group on the
stock market. Several management-controlled public conglomerates also
topped the chart. Among those, Edison was the largest holding company
in the electricity sector and Montecatini controlled mining and steel. In
1940 after the collapse of Banca Commerciale, IRI, the government-
controlled agency created in 1933, was the largest group by market capi-
talization because it had taken over all companies previously controlled by
Banca Commerciale. One new family made its appearance in the top ten,
the Pirellis.
The presence of family groups in the top ten increased steadily, reaching
four in 1960: together with Agnellis and Pirellis, we ﬁnd Pesentis and
Olivettis. Family-controlled groups controlled ﬁve of the top ten spots
from 1970 to 1990. A change in trend is evident in 2000, when only two
family-controlled groups remained in the top ten: the Agnellis and the
group controlled by Silvio Berlusconi.
A similar trend characterizes the evolution of the group controlled by
Mediobanca, a secretive investment bank chaired by Enrico Cuccia that
dominated Italian corporate ﬁnance through the second half of the cen-
tury. Table 6.7 measures very ineﬀectively the power of Mediobanca in
1970s and 1980s. Because Mediobanca typically held minority stakes in
traded companies and exercised signiﬁcant inﬂuence through board seats
and close relationships with creditor banks, it is diﬃcult to quantify its in-
ﬂuence.
Throughout the twentieth century, the Italian corporate governance sys-
tem always had a reference point, a person or institution able to balance
the interests of banks, families, and government. At the beginning of the
century, Bonaldo Stringher and the Bank of Italy served as a reference
point. From 1929 to the Second World War, the reference point was Al-
berto Beneduce and IRI. In the second half of the century, it was Enrico
Cuccia and Mediobanca.
Table 6.7 conﬁrms the view that family capitalism became important in
the ﬁfties and sixties and seems to have lost some ground since 1990. By
contrast, widely held groups decreased in importance after the Great De-
pression and decreased in importance even more after the nationalization
of the electricity industry when widely held conglomerates merged to-
gether and were taken over by the government. This trend reversed in the
354 Alexander Aganin and Paolo VolpinTable 6.7 The evolution of groups
No. of  MV  No. of  MV 
Group name companies (%) Group name companies (%)
1930 1970
Banca Commerciale 21 30.68 IRIa 18 29.30
Edison 16 13.82 Agnellib 8 16.33
Montecatini 5 4.46 Montedisona 3 8.57
SADE 6 4.34 Generali 1 5.92
Banca Italiaa 2 4.19 Pesentib 4 4.60
La Centrale 3 3.96 Bastogi 7 3.19
Snia Viscosa 8 3.75 Pirellib 2 2.61
Ligure Lombarda 4 3.34 ENIa 4 2.03
Sme 1 3.13 Sindonab 5 1.96
Agnellib 3 2.10 Olivettib 1 1.94
C4 (%) 27.12 53.29 C4 (%) 22.56 60.12
C10 (%) 38.98 73.77 C10 (%) 39.85 76.45
1940 1980
IRIa 19 23.26 IRIa 18 25.20
Edison 17 16.45 Generali 2 12.73
Montecatini 5 9.09 Agnellib 8 8.14
La Centrale 4 7.26 Montedison 10 7.84
SADE 5 5.65 Pesentib 6 7.68
Bastogi 6 4.46 Ambrosiano 5 5.55
Agnellib 2 3.46 Olivettib 1 3.99
Snia Viscosa 1 3.44 Bonomib 7 3.59
Pirellib 3 2.96 Mediobanca 1 2.93
Ligure Lombarda 5 2.66 Ferruzzib 3 2.87
C4 (%) 33.58 56.07 C4 (%) 26.76 53.92
C10 (%) 50.00 78.69 C10 (%) 42.96 80.52
1950 1990
IRIa 16 17.37 IRIa 17 18.54
Edison 11 15.04 Agnellib 22 15.00
Montecatini 3 8.48 Generali 2 11.44
La Centrale 6 5.70 Ferruzzib 13 10.02
Snia Viscosa 1 5.47 ENIa 9 5.99
Bastogi 4 4.84 De Benedettib 10 3.55
SADE 6 4.72 Ministero Tesoroa 3 3.11
Agnellib 3 4.12 Mediobanca 2 2.82
Pirellib 4 3.34 Pesentib 5 2.39
Rivab 2 3.00 Ligrestib 4 2.07
C4 (%) 27.69 46.59 C4 (%) 23.68 55.00
C10 (%) 43.08 72.08 C10 (%) 38.16 74.93
(continued)1980s and 1990s because of the government’s massive privatization pro-
gram. In 2000, large ﬁnancial groups (Generali, Intesa, San Paolo, and
Unicredito) and large conglomerates (Olivetti, ENI, ENEL, and Montedi-
son) occupied the top positions.
The current crisis at FIAT symbolizes this revolution. But the transfor-
mation goes beyond the events in the Agnelli group. Interestingly, all three
major family groups of the past have experienced signiﬁcant changes in re-
cent years. Pirelli came close to a ﬁnancial collapse in the 1990s and was
rescued by a manager, Marco Tronchetti Provera. Tronchetti Provera, who
married into the Pirelli family and steered the group away from tires toward
telecoms, is now the company’s largest shareholder. The Pesenti group ex-
perienced ﬁnancial distress in the 1980s and had to refocus on the cement
sector by selling its controlling stakes in banks and insurance companies.
The family still controls the group, although it has lost most of its eco-
nomic inﬂuence. Finally, the Agnelli group might not survive the current
crisis.
6.5.3 Discussion
So why did family capitalism persist for so long in Italy? Most likely the
absence of regulatory intervention and the abundance of government cor-
ruption preserved the right conditions for family capitalism over time.
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Table 6.7 (continued)
No. of  MV  No. of  MV 
Group name companies (%) Group name companies (%)
1960 2000
IRIa 25 22.07 Olivetti 6 24.07
Edison 12 14.28 Generali 3 10.20
Montecatini 2 7.83 ENIa 3 7.59
Agnellib 3 7.33 ENELa 1 6.55
La Centrale 6 5.25 Intesa 4 5.48
Pirellib 3 3.97 San Paolo 4 5.46
SADE 7 3.53 Unicredito 3 4.89
Pesentib 3 3.42 Berlusconib 3 3.61
Bastogi 4 3.42 Agnellib 5 2.70
Olivettib 1 3.29 Montedison 7 2.28
C4 (%) 29.58 51.51 C4 (%) 5.53 48.41
C10 (%) 46.48 74.39 C10 (%) 16.60 72.83
Notes: This table reports the name and the size (as measured by the number of traded com-
panies and the market capitalization as a percentage of the stock market capitalization) of the
ten largest groups present on the MSE at ten-year intervals from 1930 to 2000. For every year
and each measure of size, two indices of stock market concentration are provided: C4 and C10
are respectively the size of the four and ten largest groups relative to the total market.
aGovernment-controlled groups.
bFamily-controlled groups.During the entire twentieth century, there was virtually no change in the
inheritance tax in Italy. Therefore, taxation did not change a family’s in-
centives to sell controlling stakes. In contrast, the top rate of the inheri-
tance duties in Britain increased to 80 percent in 1949. Colli, Fernandez
Perez, and Rose (2003) argue that inheritance duties profoundly aﬀected
family ﬁrm behavior in Britain, causing a large increase in the number of
companies going public. Similarly, no major external institutional shocks
existed. Unlike in Japan at the end of the Second World War, the Ameri-
cans did not engage in a reform of Italian capitalism. As discussed by Am-
atori (1997), the “Americanization” process in Japan led to the improve-
ment of regulation and the dismantling of the zaibatsu, the large family
groups. In Italy, due to a lack of regulatory changes, both family- and state-
controlled groups survived after the war.
In addition to a lack of regulatory changes, little change occurred in le-
gal enforcement. Enriques (2003) shows that enforcement of the law has al-
ways been extremely poor in Italy. With poor enforcement, changes in in-
vestor protection impacted companies little. With low eﬀective investor
protection, controlling shareholders continued to enjoy large private ben-
eﬁts of control from generation to generation.
6.6 Conclusion
In recent years, Italian capitalism has shown signs of a historical trans-
formation.
Since the 1980s the stock market has grown in signiﬁcance for the Ital-
ian economy. Many important private companies, including Benetton,
Luxottica, Campari, and De Longhi, now trade publicly. Many more are
considering public listings. Furthermore, recent governments have been
committed to a program of privatization and have engaged in a stream of
reforms to improve investor protection.
At the same time, the control of the largest traded companies has become
relatively more contestable. Currently, out of the top ten groups in terms of
market capitalization, only the group led by Prime Minister Silvio Berlus-
coni is controlled with more than 30 percent of votes. The market for corpo-
rate control has become more active with the ﬁrst successful hostile takeover
in Italy occurring in 1999 (the takeover of Telecom Italia by Olivetti).
The banking sector is also undergoing a sensational transformation.
Mediobanca no longer predominates as an underwriter and investment
bank. A process of consolidation has created an oligopoly of universal
banks.
Finally, investors have become more aware of corporate governance is-
sues. As a consequence, several groups have begun simplifying their con-
trol structure by taking the holding companies in the intermediate layers of
their pyramidal groups private.
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Description of the data
This paper uses a unique set of yearly data on valuation, ﬁnancials, and
control structure of all companies traded on the MSE from 1900 to 2000.
The data have been hand-collected from several sources.
The investment guide Indici e dati(Mediobanca, various years–b) serves
as the main source of ﬁnancial data and year-end market capitalization.
Indici e dati covers most companies traded on the MSE and selected com-
panies traded on small exchanges. Another investment guide, Guida del-
l’azionista(Credito Italiano, various years), was useful for this purpose be-
cause it reports some ﬁnancial indicators for all companies traded on all
Italian stock exchanges. Unfortunately, this source provides less informa-
tion than Indici e dati on many key variables, most importantly, describing
valuation of the companies: unlike Indici e dati, Guida dell’azionista shows
only maximum and minimum yearly price instead of market values of the
companies. In most cases we are able to correct this problem by calculat-
ing market value using share prices on the last day of December published
in a Milan newspaper, Corriere della Sera, and the number of outstanding
shares from Guida dell’azionista. Since Indici e dati does not have balance
data after 1977, Guida dell’azionista and Calepino dell’azionista (Medio-
banca, various years–a) serve as the source of ﬁnancial data for the second
half of the sample.
Taccuino dell’Azionista (SASIB, various years) is the primary source of
information for control over the companies in the sample. This publication
gives brief histories of the companies listed on the MSE every year. Most
recent volumes (since 1987) also present data on exact shareholding break-
downs. Most traded Italian companies have majority shareholders con-
trolling more than 20 percent of votes in recent years. This concentration
of voting power makes our deﬁnition of control unambiguous in most
cases. Before 1987, we have precise information on ownership of all traded
companies only for 1947, from CGIL (1948). For all other years, we have
reconstructed the chain of control that ends with the ultimate owner (a
family, the state, or a widely held company), where we have used all avail-
able sources to track all transfers of controls however deﬁned. One limita-
tion of this approach is that the deﬁnition of control may vary across
sources. However, the information for 1947 suggests that ownership has al-
ways been quite concentrated. Hence, we ﬁnd it likely that the deﬁnition of
control is consistent across sources for most ﬁrms. Since we prefer to be
conservative in deﬁning control, we assume that control rests in the hands
of the most recent controlling shareholder unless we have explicit infor-
mation otherwise. In some cases our sources describe the control structure
as a coalition control or as a widely held company. The ﬁrst usually corre-
358 Alexander Aganin and Paolo Volpinsponds to an agreement by a group of shareholders to exercise relative ma-
jority control through coordinated voting of stakes with combined share
of votes less than 20 percent. No controlling shareholders or controlling
coalitions exist in the second case. We do not distinguish the cases of coali-
tion control from the cases of widely held companies in the analysis. An
incomplete list of our sources on control is the following: Amatori and
Brioschi (1997), Amatori and Colli (1999), Barca et al. (1997), Brioschi,
Buzzacchi, and Colombo (1990), Chandler, Amatori, and Hikino (1997),
Cioﬁ (1962), Colajanni (1991), De Luca (2002), Grifone (1945), Scalfari
(1961, 1963), Scalfari and Turani (1974), and Turani (1980).
Companies are classiﬁed into sixteen industrial sectors: (a) food and
agriculture; (b) banks; (c) cement, glass, and ceramics; (d) chemicals and
pharmaceuticals; (e) communications; (f) construction and real estate; (g)
editorial and paper; (h) electric; (i) electronics; (j) ﬁnancial; (k) insurance;
(l) mechanical; (m) metals; (n) textiles; (o) transportation, and (p) other in-
dustries.
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Comment Daniel Wolfenzon
Italy is one of the best-known examples of a country in which pyramidal
business groups dominate the corporate landscape. Aganin and Volpin’s
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Daniel Wolfenzon is assistant professor of ﬁnance at the Stern School of Business, New
York University.paper tracks down the origin and evolution of these groups. They also doc-
ument the history of ﬁnancial development and ownership concentration
in Italy in the twentieth century. In addition, the authors provide an inter-
esting case study of the evolution of the Pesenti group.
The paper ﬁnds that the number of ﬁrms in the Milan Stock Exchange
(MSE) has not been increasing monotonically. Instead, the number of
publicly traded ﬁrms per inhabitant was higher in the beginning of the cen-
tury than in the middle. This number starts increasing around the early
1980s and today is above the level it had in the beginning of the century.
Other variables followed an inverted U-shaped pattern. Ownership was
more concentrated in the middle part of the century than it was both in the
beginning and in the end. Also, there were more pyramids between 1930
and 1980 than there were in the periods 1900–1930 and 1980–2000.
Aganin and Volpin explain these patterns using the eﬀect of laws and the
level of government intervention in the stock market. The law and ﬁnance
view states that the number of listed ﬁrms is a positive function of the level
of investor protection (La Porta et al. 1997) and that the opposite relation
holds for ownership concentration and the level of pyramiding (Shleifer
and Wolfenzon 2002; Almeida and Wolfenzon 2004). Because in Italy the
level of protection aﬀorded by the law has been increasing over the century
but the actual patterns of the ﬁnancial variables are U-shaped, it appears
as if the law and ﬁnance view does not provide a full explanation for own-
ership and ﬁnancial development patterns.
The paper proposes that the missing force shaping these patterns is gov-
ernment intervention in the stock market. The Great Depression caused a
large number of listed ﬁrms to fail. This prompted the Italian government
to intervene in the economy by bailing them out. The upshot was that the
government kept a controlling stake in most of these failing ﬁrms. The pa-
per argues that this massive government intervention in the stock market
was the cause of the decrease in the number of listed ﬁrms. The role of the
government started to decline in the 1990s due to the large privatization
plan. In line with the political view, as the government withdrew from the
stock market, the number of listed ﬁrms started to increase again.
Aganin and Volpin have done a fantastic job of putting together the facts
with the potential explanations. Despite the fact that they analyze a single
country and that there are essentially only two changes (one from the be-
ginning of the century to the middle of the century and the other from the
middle to the end of the century), they have done a careful job at looking
at all other potential explanations.
I have two comments. First, I will argue that the law and ﬁnance view
and the political view are not mutually exclusive theories but can be seen
as two elements of a single mechanism. In my second comment I highlight
what I believe are the most important aspects of the case study of the Pe-
senti group. I think we can draw many lessons from this case study to help
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adopt a pyramidal ownership structure.
My ﬁrst comment relates to a unifying framework to think about the two
views (law and ﬁnance and politics). In this framework politics shapes the
government’s incentives to improve or worsen investor protection, and the
laws and regulations are just some of the tools that the government has at
its disposal to achieve these changes. Thus, laws do aﬀect investor protec-
tion (law and ﬁnance view), but the reason why these laws are in place can
be traced back to the government’s incentives (political view).
But how can it be that the incentives of the government do not always
point to increasing the level of investor protection? Among other reasons,
it could be that, with low levels of investor protection and the resulting
poorly developed ﬁnancial markets, talented potential entrants might not
be able to set up ﬁrms due to lack of ﬁnance. Therefore, incumbents bene-
ﬁt from a low level of investor protection since it eﬀectively acts as a bar-
rier to entry. If incumbents have suﬃcient inﬂuence over policy decisions,
investor protection will remain low. If, for some reason, incumbents lose
their inﬂuence, investor protection has the potential to improve.
This is not a new idea. In a study of more than twenty countries over the
twentieth century, Rajan and Zingales (2003) ﬁnd a similar U-shaped pat-
tern in ﬁnancial development. They explain these patterns with the diﬀer-
ent incentives that incumbent industrialists and ﬁnanciers faced through-
out the century to either retard or accelerate the level of ﬁnancial
development (see also Morck, Yeung, and Wolfenzon 2004). Moreover, in
a recent paper, Braun and Raddatz (2004) ﬁnd that, following a shock to
the political equilibrium, ﬁnancial development improves only in countries
in which the strength of the group of incumbents that beneﬁt from ﬁnan-
cial development is higher than the strength of the group that is negatively
aﬀected by it. Interestingly, and conﬁrming the uniﬁed theory of politics
and law and ﬁnance, Braun and Raddatz point to speciﬁc policy reforms
that caused the higher levels of ﬁnancial development.
However, aren’t these results inconsistent with the law and ﬁnance view
that proposes an immutable link between investor protection and legal ori-
gin? I do not think so. In my opinion, the law and ﬁnance view (La Porta
et al. 1998) makes three important contributions. The ﬁrst one is that the
rights of investors are not protected equally across jurisdictions and that
diﬀerences in this protection inﬂuences corporate decisions, ﬁnancial de-
velopment, and a number of real variables. In fact, theoretical models in
the law and ﬁnance tradition (e.g., Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002; Burkart,
Shleifer, and Panunzi 2003; Almeida and Wolfenzon 2004) simply require
that there be diﬀerences in investor protection and are agnostic about the
source of variation. These models are consistent with diﬀerences in in-
vestor protection arising from diﬀerences in the laws, but they are also con-
sistent with diﬀerences arising from enforcement, quality of accounting,
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and ﬁnance view is that diﬀerences in laws can explain a large fraction of
the variation in investor protection. Finally, the third component is that
these laws are highly correlated with the legal origin of the country. The
combined law and ﬁnance and politics view I described is perfectly consis-
tent with contributions one and two.
Going back to the case of Italy, how can we explain the U-shaped pat-
tern in the level of ﬁnancial development when the level of investor protec-
tion aﬀorded by the laws was monotonically increasing throughout the
century? After all, a strict reading of the framework I described suggests
that the eﬀects of government incentives to alter the level of investor pro-
tection should be summarized in the laws and then only these laws should
aﬀect the level of investor protection.
One potential answer is that the level investor protection aﬀorded by the
laws as measured in the paper does not capture all the relevant aspects of
investor protection. This could be due to either one of the following possi-
bilities: (a) that the authors, despite their formidable eﬀort, might not be
capturing all the relevant laws, or (b) that, in addition to the laws, there are
other factors, like the level of enforcement, that determine investor protec-
tion. If the investor protection aﬀorded by the laws as measured in the pa-
per is not a suﬃcient statistic for the actual level of investor protection,
then it is possible that other proxies of investor protection show up signif-
icantly in the regressions. One such proxy could be a measure of the gov-
ernment’s incentives to maintain a low level of investor protection. It turns
out that government involvement in the stock market is a good measure of
these incentives. As the authors explain, during the period in which the
Italian government had a signiﬁcant presence in the stock market, it had
no incentives to improve the level of investor protection. However, when
the time came to privatize the state-owned enterprises, the government had
strong incentives to provide the highest level of investor protection pos-
sible. As Aganin and Volpin ﬁnd, including both the level of protection
aﬀorded by the laws and the level of government intervention in the stock
market in the regressions leads to the right sign on the coeﬃcient of in-
vestor protection.
My second comment relates to the case study of the Pesenti group. The
paper documents how the group grew from a single ﬁrm to a very large or-
ganization composed of many independent ﬁrms in a period of roughly
130 years. Most of the time, new ﬁrms were added to the group as partial
subsidiaries of existing ﬁrms, thereby creating a pyramid. The case study
also documents the enormous ﬁnancing needs of the Pesenti group.
There is an emerging literature trying to explain the existence of business
groups and their ownership structure. We can draw a couple of lessons
from this case study. First, groups are not formed instantly; rather, they
grow over time, starting from a single ﬁrm. As a result, a theory of business
364 Alexander Aganin and Paolo Volpingroups and pyramids should incorporate these dynamic aspects. Thinking
about business groups as the optimal organization form chosen at a single
point in time is perhaps less realistic. Second, the Pesenti group needed a
great deal of external ﬁnance to set up or buy new ﬁrms. Members of the
Pesenti family could have avoided creating a pyramid by setting up these
new ﬁrms and holding shares directly in them. However, this would have
required raising even more external ﬁnance. Setting the ﬁrm up as a partial
subsidiary (pyramid) allowed the family to tap the internal resources of the
existing ﬁrms. Thus, pyramids emerge as a result of large ﬁnancing needs
and poorly developed capital markets. In a recent paper Almeida and
Wolfenzon (2004) explain the creation of groups and the use of pyramidal
ownership using these two elements: a dynamic framework and poor ﬁ-
nancial development.
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